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Abstract 
Knowledge about cue polarity (i.e., the sign of a cue-criterion relation) seems to boost 
performance in a wide range of inference tasks. Knowledge about cue polarity information 
may enhance performance by increasing (1) the reliance on rule- relative to similarity-based 
strategies, and (2) explicit knowledge about the relative importance of cues. We investigated 
the relative contribution of these two mechanisms in a multiple-cue judgment task and a 
categorization task, which typically differ in the inference strategies they elicit and potentially 
the explicit task knowledge available to participants. In both tasks participants preferred rule-
based relative to similarity-based strategies and had more knowledge about cue importance 
when cue polarity information was provided. Strategy selection was not related to increases in 
performance in the categorization task and could only partly explain increases in performance 
in the judgment task. In contrast, explicit knowledge about the importance of cues was related 
to better performance in both categorization and judgment independently of the strategy used. 
In sum, our results suggest that the benefits of receiving cue polarity information may span 
across tasks, such multiple-cue judgment and categorization, primarily by enhancing 
knowledge of relative cue importance. 
 
Keywords: category learning; judgment; decision making; knowledge; computational 
modeling 
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1. Introduction 
Professionals such as teachers, doctors, and lawyers are specifically trained to make 
decisions about grades, procedures, and sentences that have profound effects on people’s 
lives. But how should decision-making be taught and which information should be given to 
such professionals to ensure good decisions? Our work makes a small contribution to this 
issue by investigating how providing a specific type of information to individuals affects 
performance in different tasks. Research suggests that providing task information to decision 
makers has a positive impact on performance (e.g., Balzer et al., 1989; Murphy, 2002). 
However, why knowledge increases performance and the degree to which performance 
increases are specific to particular tasks or inference strategies is less well understood. The 
goal of this paper is to investigate the mechanisms by which providing one type of 
knowledge, namely, cue polarity information (i.e., the sign of a cue-criterion relation) 
influences individuals’ performance in judgment and categorization tasks.  
1.1. The effects of prior information: Cue polarity 
Tasks that are embedded in meaningful contexts usually yield better performance than 
context-free tasks (Adelman, 1981; Evans et al., 2005; Kaplan and Murphy, 2000; Muchinsky 
and Dudycha, 1975; for reviews see Heit, 1997 or Murphy, 2002). For example, Muchinsky 
and Dudycha (1975) showed that participants predicted applicants’ “credit scores” 
significantly better based on “debt” and “number of creditors” than when the same 
information was provided as “criterion”, “cue 1”, and “cue 2”. Overall, giving task 
information has been shown to increase performance in judgment tasks (e.g., Balzer et al., 
1989; Balzer et al., 1992). One piece of information that seems to be especially helpful and 
which could explain the beneficial effect of context information is cue polarity. According to 
Dawes and Corrigan (1974), knowing cue polarity is a crucial factor for successful 
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performance in judgment. In line with this view, a few findings suggest that providing cue 
polarity information—that is, providing initial knowledge about the sign of cue-criterion 
relations (positive vs. negative)—improves performance in inference tasks such as 
categorization (Newell et al., 2009), and multiple-cue judgment (von Helversen and 
Rieskamp, 2009). In this paper we will investigate two mechanisms that could underlie 
performance increases: (1) strategy selection and (2) explicit knowledge about cue 
importance. 
1.2. Cognitive strategies in categorization and judgment 
Psychological theories of categorization and judgment suggest that people use at least 
two broad types of strategies to solve inference problems: rule-based strategies (e.g., Bruner 
et al., 1956; Einhorn et al., 1979) and similarity-based strategies (e.g., Medin and Schaffer, 
1978; Nosofsky and Johansen, 2000). A prototypical rule-based strategy that is frequently 
used in inferences tasks is the cue abstraction strategy. The cue abstraction strategy assumes 
that a judgment or decision rule is identified by abstracting the relation of individual pieces of 
information (i.e., cues) to the criterion. For example, a doctor may prescribe a specific 
treatment (criterion) based on a few critical symptoms (cues) such as fever duration or 
magnitude, weighted by their respective importance. The cue abstraction strategy can be 
described by a linear additive model such as multiple linear regression (e.g. Brehmer, 1994; 
Cooksey, 1996; Juslin et al., 2003).  
In turn, an inference is considered similarity-based if it relies on the similarity of a 
probe to exemplars retrieved from memory (e.g., Medin and Schaffer, 1978), such as when a 
doctor prescribes a treatment based on the patient’s symptom-profile being similar to a 
previously encountered patient, where the similarity is determined by the overlap of the 
patients’ symptoms weighted by the attention allocated to them. Similarity-based judgments 
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are frequently described by exemplar models (Juslin et al., 2008; Nosofosky and Johansen, 
2000; Hoffmann et al., 2013). 
Both rule-based and similarity-based strategies have been observed in categorization 
(e.g., Allen and Brooks, 1991; Ashby et al., 1998; Pachur and Olsson, 2012), judgment (e.g., 
Juslin et al., 2008; von Helversen and Rieskamp, 2008), decision-making (e.g., Juslin and 
Persson, 2002; Pachur and Olsson, 2012), and induction tasks (e.g., Sloutsky et al., 2007). 
Past research suggests, however, that a preference for rule- over similarity-based processes is 
usually the norm, that is, individuals try to learn cue–criterion relations to use in a rule-based 
fashion and only default to exemplar-based strategies as a backup solution (Juslin et al., 2003; 
Nosofsky and Bergert, 2007; Platzer and Bröder, 2012). The frequency with which different 
strategies are selected depends on the nature of the task representation, which in turn may 
depend on the characteristics of the task. There is consensus that some task structures may 
facilitate the abstraction of cue-criterion relations and thus the use of rule- versus similarity-
based strategies (Juslin et al., 2008). For instance, a rule-based cue abstraction strategy is 
chosen more frequently in linear judgment tasks (i.e. the criterion is a linear function of the 
cues), whereas similarity-based exemplar strategies are preferred in non-linear judgment tasks 
(i.e. the criterion is a nonlinear function of the cues, Hoffmann et al., 2013; Juslin et al., 2008; 
Pachur and Olsson, 2012). The rationale being that linear relations can be learned and 
represented by an explicit model of cue abstraction, while non-linear cue-criterion relations 
cannot, and thus the task must be solved by a similarity-based strategy. 
Providing cue polarity information may similarly foster the use of rule-based 
strategies by enabling the accurate and explicit representation of cue-criterion relations. 
Indeed, evidence is mounting that receiving cue polarity information increases the reliance on 
rule-based over similarity-based strategies. For instance, Platzer and Bröder (2012) found that 
providing cue polarity information induced a shift to rule-based processing in a memory-
based paired comparison task (see also Bröder et al., 2010). Similarly, von Helversen and 
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Rieskamp (2009) reported a stronger reliance on a rule- relative to a similarity-based strategy 
in a non-linear multiple-cue judgment task when cue polarity information was available. But 
what are the consequences of such changes in strategy selection and task representation on 
performance? 
1.3. Strategy selection and performance 
In linear tasks, reliance on rule-based processing may lead to superior performance 
because a cue abstraction strategy matches the underlying task-structure. This not only 
enables accurate performance in a training sample but also allows judges to accurately 
generalize to new cases, even if they require extrapolation that is judgments outside the range 
of experienced criterion values. In contrast, similarity-based processing may not capture the 
task-structure in linear tasks when provided with limited training (Juslin et al., 2003). Thus, 
even if users of an exemplar strategy perform well in a training sample, the good performance 
may not generalize to new cases. In particular, exemplar-based strategies fail at extrapolation, 
because they cannot predict a value outside of the previously experienced range of values (see 
also Delosh et al., 1997; Pachur and Olsson, 2012). In this vein, research shows an advantage 
for rule-based strategies over similarity-based strategies in a variety of linear tasks such as 
judgment (Hoffmann et al., 2013; von Helversen et al., 2010) and paired comparison (Pachur 
and Olsson, 2012). Furthermore, Newell and colleagues (2009) found that when cue polarity 
information was provided in a probabilistic categorization task, participants not only 
performed better, but their responses were also well described by a rule-based strategy.  
Note that the performance advantages of relying on a cue abstraction strategy relative 
to an exemplar-based strategy should apply to both categorization and multiple-cue judgment 
under limited training conditions (cf. von Helversen et al., 2010; Juslin et al., 2008). 
However, in practice the relative advantage of human judges relying on cue abstraction differs 
between judgment and categorization tasks: Empirical results suggest that cue abstraction 
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users perform better than exemplar users in (linear) judgment tasks, but show similar or 
inferior performance relative to exemplar users in (linear) categorization tasks (Hoffmann et 
al., 2013; Mata et al., 2012; von Helversen et al., 2010; von Helversen and Rieskamp, 2008). 
One reason why performance differences between exemplar and cue abstraction strategies are 
observed in judgment but not in categorization tasks could be the differential ease with which 
the information necessary for a cue abstraction strategy is learnt in judgment versus 
categorization. When solving a judgment task, people receive more fine-grained feedback 
about the criterion than when solving a categorization task. The more fine-grained feedback 
likely facilitates learning cue polarities and relative cue importance (see the next section) 
necessary for applying a cue abstraction strategy. This is the case because objects that differ 
in their cue values may fall into the same category in a categorization task, but still have 
different criterion values in a judgment task. This difference in criterion values, in turn, can be 
used to infer cue polarity. Accordingly, people may find it more difficult to learn cue 
polarities in categorization, which in turn could lead to a suboptimal execution of the strategy 
or even a switch to exemplar-based strategies. Indeed, Platzer and Bröder (2012) found that 
the quality of cue abstraction knowledge mediated the shift to rule-based strategies in a paired 
comparison task. In addition, often more people are classified as users of an exemplar-based 
strategy relative to users of a cue abstraction strategy in categorization than in judgment tasks 
(Juslin et al., 2003; Mata et al., 2012; von Helversen et al., 2010, but see Pachur and Olsson, 
20121).  
In light of the reasons listed above, providing cue polarity information will likely 
increase reliance on cue abstraction, which will in turn benefit performance in (linear) 
judgment tasks. The impact of providing cue polarity information and the possible shift to cue !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!1!Contrary to other findings in the literature, Pachur and Olsson (2012) did not find a larger number of exemplar 
strategy users in a categorization relative to a judgment task. One potential reason for the diverging results may 
be that Pachur and Olsson provided participants with feedback about the continuous criterion value in both, the 
categorization and judgment tasks.!!!
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abstraction in categorization is less clear. If cue abstraction users are unable to outperform 
exemplar-based ones because they fail to learn cue polarity information, explicitly instructing 
participants about cue polarities may lead to increased reliance on cue abstraction and, 
ultimately, improve performance. Alternatively, to the extent that providing cue polarity 
information is not enough to produce a significant improvement on the execution of a cue 
abstraction strategy, it is possible that providing judges with cue polarity information does not 
lead to performance benefits. One factor that may be crucial to increasing performance is the 
extent to which providing cue polarity information also contributes to improving knowledge 
of relative cue importance—an issue we turn to next. 
1.4. Knowledge of cue importance and performance 
A second mechanism underlying how cue polarity information can improve 
performance is by increasing the knowledge participants have about the importance of the 
cues. Good performance in a multiple cue judgment task requires—besides knowledge about 
the cue polarity—knowledge about the relative importance of the cues’ performance 
(Brehmer, 1979, 1994). Eliminating the need to learn cue polarity information may liberate 
resources necessary to learn the relative cue importance (i.e., cue weights) used by cue 
abstraction strategies. Indeed, Platzer and Bröder (2012) found that participants had better 
knowledge about the cue validities when cue polarity information was provided. Better 
knowledge of cue importance, in turn, should enhance performance by improving how well a 
strategy is executed.  
It is unclear, however, if knowledge about cue importance will benefit users of cue 
abstraction and exemplar-based strategies equally. Platzer and Bröder (2012) found that better 
explicit knowledge predicted choosing a rule-based strategy. This suggests that users of an 
exemplar-based strategy do not acquire explicit knowledge about the task, resonating with the 
idea that using a similarity-based strategy is a largely implicit process (Ashby et al., 1998). 
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Accordingly, this would suggest that explicit knowledge is associated with performance for 
cue abstraction users but not for exemplar users. Notwithstanding, knowledge about cue 
importance could improve performance independently of the strategy selected. Rehder and 
Hoffman (2005) found the amount of attention given to relevant cues was positively 
associated with performance when using a similarity-based strategy. Thus, knowledge about 
cue importance may improve performance by guiding the amount of attention given to 
specific cues when using a similarity-based strategy. 
In sum, there are two potential mechanisms that could explain why cue polarity 
information increases performance in inference tasks, namely by increasing (1) the reliance of 
rule-based over exemplar-based strategies in the appropriate environment and (2) the 
knowledge of relative cue importance necessary for guiding attention or weighting of cues. 
We conducted two studies to find out how these two mechanisms affect performance. In study 
1, we concentrated on how cue polarity information impacts strategy selection and whether it 
influences performance similarly in categorization and judgment tasks. In study 2, we went 
one step further and examined how cue polarity knowledge is related to explicit knowledge 
about cue importance, and its links to strategy selection and performance.  
2. Study 1 
The goal of study 1 was to investigate whether cue polarity information increases 
reliance on rule-based relative to similarity-based strategies and if this shift is related to 
performance increases in both judgment and categorization. 
2.1. Method 
2.1.1. Participants 
Ninety-four young adults participated in the task (Mage = 25.9 years, SD = 3.44; 50% 
females). Most participants were students of one of the Berlin universities, on average in their 
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5th year of studies. The study lasted for approximately 1.5h. Participants were paid 
performance dependent and earned on average €11.1 (plus a €5 show-up fee).  
2.1.2. Design and procedure 
The participants’ task was to judge how successful cartoon characters, the Sonics, 
were in a hunting game (see Juslin et al., 2003; Mata et al., 2012, for similar designs; details 
on the instructions can be found in the supplementary material A). Participants could use four 
binary cues to make the judgments (i.e., type of ears, type of nose, color of the belly, and 
hairstyle, which were pretested to ensure equal salience, see von Helversen et al., 2010). We 
varied the type of task (categorization vs. judgment; between-subjects) and whether 
participants received information about the polarity of the cues prior to the task (information 
vs. no information; between-subjects). In the categorization task participants had to decide 
whether a Sonic was a successful or an unsuccessful player. In the multiple-cue judgment task 
participants had to give an estimate of how many points a Sonic would win in the game on a 
scale from 10 to 20. In the no-information condition participants were told that they would 
have the opportunity to learn which Sonics were successful during a training phase. In the 
information condition participants received additional cue polarity information; that is, they 
were shown which cue values would indicate a successful player. The training phase 
consisted of 10 Sonics that were shown block wise (see Table 1).  
After the training phase, a test phase followed during which participants judged all 
possible 16 Sonics four times (i.e., 10 old items from the training phase and 6 new transfer 
items that they had not seen before). The 10 Sonics used in the training set were selected so 
that relying on an exemplar and a cue abstraction strategy would result in different judgments 
for the new objects in the test phase given the assumption that the two strategies were applied 
without error. In each block of the training phase the 10 Sonics were presented in a random 
order. In each training trial participants saw a Sonic and were asked to judge it. Afterwards 
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they received feedback and continued with the next Sonic. The training phase continued for a 
minimum of 8 blocks and a maximum of 16 blocks. After the initial 8 blocks, training stopped 
if participants passed an accuracy criterion. We used an accuracy criterion for several reasons. 
For one, an accuracy criterion allows focusing on participants that took the task seriously and 
managed to solve it reasonably well. Additionally, a learning criterion allows better 
comparison between individuals because it minimizes differences in performance at the end 
of training. The accuracy criterion was set at 0.5 root mean square deviation (RMSD) for the 
categorization task (equivalent to correctly classifying 8 out of 10 exemplars) and at 1.5 
RMSD for the judgment task. Participants were paid according to their performance in the 
task. In the categorization task, participants received 10 points for every correct classification. 
In the judgment task, participants received 10 points if they judged the correct criterion value, 
5 points if they deviated by only one point, and zero points otherwise. After the task, points 
were exchanged into Euros at a rate of €1 for 100 points and paid to the participants. 
2.1.3. Materials 
The Sonics could have one of two cue values on each cue (i.e., spiky hair vs. 
dreadlocks), which were randomly assigned a zero or one. In the multiple-cue judgment task 
the criterion C was a linear additive function of the cue values. 
C = 10 + 4c1 + 3c2 + 2 c3 +1c4  (1) 
The criterion in the categorization task was constructed from the criterion in the judgment 
task: Sonics making more than 15 points were classified as successful and Sonics making less 
than 15 points as unsuccessful. Details on the task structure can be found in Table 1. 
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2.2. Results 
In the following, we first report how cue polarity information affected participants’ 
performance in the categorization and judgment tasks. We then assess the impact of providing 
cue polarity information on the reliance on rule-based vs. similarity-based processes. We 
analyzed the results for the categorization and the judgment task separately because the 
performance measures are not on the same scale and thus do not allow a direct comparison 
between the categorization and judgment tasks. 
2.2.1. Performance 
As measures of performance we considered learning speed (measured by the number 
of blocks participants needed to reach the learning criterion), learning performance (measured 
by the accuracy at the end of the learning phase), and test performance (measured by the 
accuracy in the test phase; see Table 2 for means and SDs). We measured accuracy as the 
RMSD between participants’ judgments (averaged across the four repetitions in the test phase) 
and the criterion. In the test phase we separately considered accuracy for old items (i.e., items 
known from the training phase) and transfer items (i.e., new items that participants had not 
seen before). We consider performance for old and new items separately, because 
performance differences are particularly likely on the new items. While both strategies can in 
principle perfectly learn to judge the training set, the degree to which the two strategies allow 
correctly generalizing to the new items differs; whereas the cue abstraction model matches the 
structure of the task, the exemplar model does not, leading to a higher expected performance 
of the cue abstraction model on the new, but not on the old items (see also Table 1). 
We compared performance with and without cue polarity information in the judgment 
and the categorization task separately using t-tests. If the variances in the two groups differed 
we adjusted the degrees of freedom according to the Welch correction. In the judgment task, 
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participants needed fewer blocks when cue polarity information was given than when no cue 
polarity information was given, t(30.25) = 3.99 p < .001. Participants with cue polarity 
information also performed better at the end of the training phase than participants without 
cue polarity information, t(48) = 3.37, p = .002, even though they received less training. 
Similarly, participants with cue polarity information performed better in the test phase than 
participants without cue polarity information, for the old items, t(48) = 2.89, p = .01, as well 
as for the transfer items, t(48) = 4.40, p < .001. Because we had found differences in 
performance at the end of training, we conducted analyses of variance for the performance 
measures in the test phase, adding performance at the end of training as a covariate. The goal 
of these analyses was to exclude that better results at test were only due to differences in 
learning. These analyses showed that the effect of cue polarity information was not longer 
significant for the old items, but the effect of cue polarity information on the new items 
remained significant. 
 In the categorization task, participants with cue polarity information needed somewhat 
fewer blocks than participants without cue polarity information, t(27.08) = 1.98, p = .06, but 
they did not perform better at the end of training, t(42) = 0.95, p = .35, or during the test 
phase, for neither old items, t(42) = 1.50, p = .14, nor new items, t(42) = 0.1, p = .99. In sum, 
cue polarity improved performance in the judgment task, but not in the categorization task. 
2.2.2. Model classification 
To determine if participants relied on a cue abstraction or an exemplar-based strategy, 
we relied on a computational modeling approach. We modeled participants’ responses with an 
exemplar model and a cue abstraction model and then classified them to the better fitting 
strategy. 
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2.2.2.1 Exemplar model 
The exemplar model assumes that the estimated criterion value  for the probe p is 
the average of the criterion values c, weighted by their similarity to the probe, 
,      (2) 
where S is the similarity of the probe to the stored exemplars; xi is the criterion value of the 
exemplar i; and I is the number of stored exemplars in memory. In the judgment task we used 
the number of Golbis caught as the criterion and in the categorization task the probability of a 
Sonic being classified as successful. The similarity between the stored exemplar and the probe 
is calculated by the similarity rule of the generalized context model (GCM, Nosofsky, 1984): 
Specifically, the similarity between exemplars is found by transforming the distance 
between them. The distance d between a probe p and an exemplar i is 
                        (3) 
where cpj and cij, respectively, are the cue values of the probe p and an exemplar i on cue 
dimension j, h is a sensitivity parameter that reflects discriminability in psychological space 
(Nosofsky and Zaki, 1998) and the parameters sj are the attention weights associated with cue 
dimension j. Attention weights vary between 0 and 1 and are constrained to sum to 1. The 
similarity S between a probe p and an exemplar i is a nonlinearly decreasing function of their 
distance (dpi) 
.                (4) 
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2.2.2.2 Cue abstraction 
The cue abstraction model assumes that the judgment ŷ of an object p is the sum of the 
weighted cue values c1 ... cj, plus an intercept k. 
             (5) 
where the intercept k and the weights w are free parameters. If k = 10. w1 = 4. w2 = 3. w3 = 2 
and w4 = 1, equation 5 is identical to the function determining the continuous criterion and the 
model produces perfect judgments.  
 In the binary task, we modeled the proportion of Sonics classified as successful p(b 
=1) by a smoother logistic function to take into account random error (c.f. Juslin et al., 2003): 
 .          (6) 
where Wi are the cue weights and k the intercept. 
2.2.2.3 Model fitting and classification 
To determine which model best described participants’ responses we relied on a leave-
one-out cross-validation method (cf. von Helversen et al., 2010). We fitted each models’ free 
parameters on the average response of an individual participant to fifteen of the test items, 
minimizing the sum of squares between the participants’ responses and the models’ 
predictions. We then predicted with the estimated parameter values the response to the 
sixteenth item. This was repeated for all sixteen test items. The final goodness-of-fit measure 
was the RMSD between the model predictions on the sixteen predicted items and participants’ 
responses. For the exemplar model, we fitted four free parameters, an attention weight for 
each cue constrained to sum to one and a sensitivity parameter, with a nonlinear least square 
algorithm (lsqcurvefit function from the optimization toolbox in Matlab). To fit the cue 
abstraction model we run a multiple linear regression on the individual judgments. In the 
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categorization task, we fitted a logistic regression and then optimized parameters with a 
nonlinear least square fit (see exemplar model), constraining the intercept to fall between -10 
and 10 to receive more stable estimates. Model fits are reported in the supplementary material 
B, mean model fits in Table S1 and individual model fits in Table S2. 
We classified participants according to the model that fit their responses best (see 
Table S2). To ensure a robust classification we only classified participants for which the 
difference in fits by the two models was larger than one standard error of the overall model 
fits in this condition. In the judgment task, 5 participants without information, and 3 with 
information could not be unambiguously classified. In the categorization task, 7 participants 
in the condition without information could not be classified. We excluded these participants 
from further analyses that relied on participant classification. We then tested if providing cue 
polarity information induced participants to rely on a cue abstraction strategy. As illustrated in 
Figure 1, the majority of participants in the judgment task was classified as using cue 
abstraction regardless of whether cue polarity information was provided (see Table 3); 
nevertheless, Chi-square tests indicated that if cue polarity information was given, the number 
of cue abstraction users somewhat increased, Χ2(1,42) = 4.18, p = .06. More dramatically, in 
the categorization task without cue polarity information, the majority of participants was 
classified as exemplar users, whereas in the condition with prior information the majority was 
classified as cue abstraction users, Χ2(1,37) = 14.60, p < .001. 
In sum, without cue polarity information there was a stronger reliance on a similarity-
based exemplar- strategy in the categorization than in the multiple-cue judgment task. 
However, receiving cue polarity information led to almost exclusive reliance on rule-based 
cue abstraction strategy in both categorization and judgment tasks. 
2.2.3. Model classification and performance 
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 Next, we tested whether strategy selection was related to performance. We focused on 
the new items, because differences between strategies are more likely to be reflected on the 
new items, however the pattern of results is similar when using the complete test set. Zero-
order correlations indicated a significant correlation between strategy selection and 
performance on the new test items in the judgment, r(42) = .36, p = .02, but not in the 
categorization task, r(37) = .07, p = .66. We tested whether cue polarity information provided 
an influence on performance above the influence of strategy selection by conducting a follow-
up regression analysis: The analysis showed that in the judgment task cue polarity 
information was still a significant predictor of performance on the new test items, when 
strategy selection was included as an additional predictor, b = -.48, t(39) = 3.54, p = .001. In 
the categorization task, neither cue polarity information nor strategy selection influenced 
performance (ps > .80). 
2.3. Discussion study 1 
Study 1 examined whether providing cue polarity information increases performance 
through its impact on strategy selection. Consistent with prior research, we found that when 
cue polarity information was provided participants in both judgment and categorization tasks 
preferred a cue abstraction strategy relative to an exemplar-based strategy (Platzer and 
Bröder, 2012; Bröder et al., 2010; von Helversen and Rieskamp, 2009). However, whereas in 
the categorization task the dominant strategy changed, in the judgment task the increase in 
cue abstraction users was less pronounced. This was mainly due to a larger number of cue 
abstraction users in the judgment than in the categorization task when no cue polarity 
information was provided. These results resonate with prior research reporting more users of 
an exemplar-based strategy than users of cue abstraction in categorization (Juslin et al., 2003; 
Mata et al., 2012). They also are consistent with the hypothesis that people rely on exemplar-
based strategies in categorization tasks without cue polarity information because strategy 
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selection depends on the ease with which cue polarities can be abstracted (for a similar 
argument see, Platzer and Bröder, 2012; Pachur and Olsson, 2012).  
Concerning potential performance benefits of providing cue polarity information, we 
found that participants in the categorization task did not perform better when cue polarity 
information was provided. This suggests that although people may switch to a cue abstraction 
strategy when cue polarity information is available, the differences in accuracy between the 
exemplar-based and cue abstraction strategies are not enough to cause a significant increase in 
performance. One reason why performance between users of an exemplar-based and a cue 
abstraction strategy did not differ in categorization is that they were masked by reliance on a 
less sensitive performance measure in categorization than in judgment. However, additional 
analyses using a binary performance measure in both tasks, showed the same pattern of 
results. 2 Another reason could be, that in categorization cue abstraction users do not manage 
to execute the cue abstraction strategy well enough to reach a noticeable differences in 
performance to an exemplar-based strategy, resulting in a similar performance of both 
strategies.  
In contrast, in the judgment task, cue polarity information was related to better 
performance, providing further evidence that cue polarity information improves inferences 
(e.g., Newell et al., 2009). Furthermore, selecting a cue abstraction strategy was positively 
related to performance as would be expected in a linear judgment task (e.g. Hoffmann et al., 
2013). The influence of cue polarity information on performance, however, remained 
significant, even if strategy selection was included as a predictor. This suggests that the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!2!We examined the sensitivity issue by conducting analyses for both, multiple-cue judgment and categorization, 
using a binary performance measure. For this measure we classified judgments > 15 as a “successful” response, 
judgments < 15 as a “not successful” response, and judgments = 15 as having a probability of 0.5 of being a 
“successful” or “not successful” response. We then calculated the percentage of correct responses in both tasks. 
The results based on this performance measure are similar in that they suggest (1) a superior performance of cue 
abstraction relative to exemplar-based users in the multiple-cue judgment but not the categorization task and (2) 
a superior performance with cue polarity information in the multiple cue judgment but not in the categorization 
task.!
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performance benefits of cue polarity information in the judgment task may not be solely 
attributable to a switch in strategy selection. 
In sum, study 1 showed that cue polarity information increased performance in 
judgment, but not in categorization, and found some support that strategy selection is linked 
to performance in the judgment task. Interestingly, strategy selection could not explain all 
variance in performance, suggesting that further mechanisms play a role. In study 2 we 
considered knowledge about cue importance as a further mechanism underlying how cue 
polarity information may increase performance. 
3. Study 2 
Study 2 investigated whether providing cue polarity information increased explicit 
knowledge about relative cue importance and how knowledge about cue importance and 
strategy selection contributed to performance. In addition we increased the sample size and 
the learning criterion to ensure that the lack of performance increase in categorization was not 
due to insufficient learning. 
3.1. Method 
3.1.1. Participants 
In study 2, 155 students (41% female) from Clarkson University participated for course credit 
and a performance-dependent incentive. Participants were randomly assigned to the four 
conditions with 39 participants in the categorization condition with information, 41 
participants in the categorization condition without information, 37 participants in the 
judgment condition with information, and 38 participants in the judgment condition without 
information. Participants were on average 19.6 years old (SD = 1.36). 
3.1.2. Design and materials 
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Study 2 was a replication of study 1 with some minor changes. In particular, we increased the 
number of training trials and the learning criterion to achieve better mastering of training 
items. The training phase continued until a maximum of 200 learning trials had been 
completed or until a RMSD of 1 had been reached in the judgment task. In the categorization 
task, the training criterion was reached if in two consecutive blocks only one Sonic was 
falsely classified, corresponding to a RMSD of 0.2. We also changed the payoff structure to 
incentivize speedy learning. In study 2, participants entered a lottery for $100 in each 
condition. During the study they could earn points that were translated into lottery tickets at 
the end of the experiment. In the training phase participants could earn 500 points if they 
reached the training criterion. Participants continued with the test phase as soon as the 
learning criterion had been reached. In the test phase, participants could earn additional points 
with their judgments, according to the same payoff scheme as in study 1. For details on 
instructions see supplementary material A. At the end of study 2 we asked participants about 
their knowledge about cue polarity and cue importance. To measure their knowledge about 
cue polarity we asked them to indicate the direction of each cue (positive, negative). In 
addition, participants indicated the relative importance of each cue by distributing 100 points 
across the four cues as a function of their importance. 
3.2. Results 
3.2.1 Performance 
As in study 1, we analyzed if cue polarity information increased performance 
separately in the categorization and the judgment task. First, we examined how many 
participants reached the learning criterion. The analysis showed that in both tasks more 
participants reached the learning criterion when cue polarity information was given. In the 
categorization task, 11 of 41 did not reach the learning criterion when no information was 
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given, but only 2 of 39 failed to reach the criterion when cue polarity information was 
available,  Χ2(1,80) = 6.92, p = .01. In the judgment task, 26 of 38 did not reach the criterion 
when no information was given, but only 6 of 37 failed to do so when cue polarity 
information was available,  Χ2(1,75) = 20.89, p < .001. In the following analyses, we included 
all participants but the conclusions do not change when only including the participants that 
reached the learning criterion. 
We measured performance as learning speed, learning performance (accuracy at the 
end of the learning phase), and test performance (accuracy during test; see Table 4) and tested 
for an effect of cue polarity using t-tests. If the variance between groups differed, we adjusted 
the degrees of freedom according to the Welch correction. As in the first study, we analyzed 
performance for old and new items separately because performance differences due to 
strategy selection should be more marked in the new items. In the judgment task, participants 
with cue polarity information required fewer learning blocks, t(73) = 6.30, p < .001, 
performed better at the end of training, t(73) = 3.29, p = .002, and performed better at test, old 
items, t(73) = 4.73, p < .001, new items, t(73) = 5.84, p < .001. Providing cue polarity 
information also improved performance in the categorization task. Participants with cue 
polarity information required fewer training blocks, t(78) = 4.52, p < .001, performed better at 
the end of training, t(51.92) = 2.92, p = .005, and performed better at test, old items, t(73.02) 
= 1.73, p = .09, new items, t(78) = 3.17, p = .002. Because we had found differences in 
performance at the end of training, we conducted analyses of variance for the performance 
measures in the test phase, adding performance at the end of training as a covariate. The goal 
of these analyses was to exclude that better results at test were only due to differences in 
learning. In both judgment and categorization, cue polarity still affected accuracy for the new 
test items, ps < .001. In the judgment task, cue polarity information also influenced 
performance on the old test items, p = .002, but not in the categorization task, p = .26. These 
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results suggest that providing cue polarity information has an impact on performance on new 
items at test that goes beyond those of improved learning in the training phase. 
3.2.2. Model classification 
As in study 1, we fitted an exemplar model and a cue abstraction model to 
participants’ responses and classified participants as users of their best-fitting model. Mean as 
well as individual model fits and classifications are reported in the supplementary material C 
in Tables S3 and S4, respectively. Five participants in the categorization condition could not 
be unambiguously classified to one of the models and were excluded from further analyses. 
Figure 2 presents the categorization results as a function of condition and task. In contrast to 
study 1, in the condition without information, we found similar percentages of exemplar 
strategy users in both the judgment and the categorization tasks. We used Chi-Square tests to 
analyze if cue polarity information influenced strategy selection. As expected, we replicated 
the finding in study 1 that providing information about cue polarity increased the percentage 
of cue abstraction users in the judgment,  Χ2(1,70) = 21.05 p < .001, and the categorization 
tasks,  Χ2(1,74) = 13.93, p < .001, see Table 5. 
3.2.3. Knowledge about cue importance 
 To assess the quality of participants’ knowledge about cue importance we created an 
index of cue importance knowledge. We calculated the index as a sum score of the absolute 
value (abs) of the difference between the cue importance indicated by a participant and the 
optimal cue importance for each cue (i.e., the cue weights in Equation 1 for each cue 
transferred to a scale from 0 to 100). Thus, a participant using the optimal weights would have 
a score of zero, whereas for example a participant considering only the first cue (i.e., giving it 
a weight of 100) but ignoring the other cues would have a score of 120 [i.e., abs(100-40) + 
abs(0-30) + abs(0-20) + abs(0-10)].  
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We then tested whether cue polarity information influenced the quality of cue 
importance knowledge in judgment and categorization (for means and SD see Table 4). 
Providing cue polarity information improved knowledge about cue importance both in the 
judgment, t(73) = 2.79, p = .007, and categorization tasks, t(78) = 2.74, p = .008. In a second 
step we investigated if the increase in knowledge depends on the selected strategy by running 
an analysis of variance (ANOVA) with cue importance knowledge as dependent variable and 
cue polarity information and model classification (exemplar-based/cue abstraction model) as 
between subject factors. In the judgment task, we found that participants classified as users of 
a cue abstraction strategy had better knowledge about cue importance than users of an 
exemplar-based strategy, MEBM = 50.71, SD = 26.26 vs. MCAM = 25.48, SD = 24.72, F(1,66) = 
9.41, p  = .004, but found no main effect of cue polarity information, F(1,66) = 0.29, p = .59, 
nor an interaction, F(1,66) = 0.99, p = .32. In the categorization task, we found no main effect 
of model or cue polarity information, but a significant interaction between the two factors, 
F(1,70) = 5.38, p = .02, suggesting that knowledge about cue importance increased for cue 
abstraction users with cue polarity information (Mno info =  63, SD = 23.98 vs. Minfo = 41.93, 
SD = 13.62), but not for users of an exemplar-based strategy (Mno info =  55.84, SD = 22.46 vs. 
Minfo = 59.56, SD = 27.67). 
3.2.4. Model classification, cue importance knowledge, and performance 
In a next step, we investigated how strategy selection and cue importance knowledge 
contributed to performance in judgment and categorization using hierarchical regression. We 
focused again on performance on the new items because they are more informative regarding 
strategy selection, however, analyses on the complete test set yield comparable results. In a 
first step, we regressed accuracy on the new test items on cue polarity information. In a 
second step, we included strategy classification and cue importance knowledge as additional 
predictors in the regression. In the judgment task, cue polarity information had a strong 
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influence on performance in the first step. Further, strategy classification and cue importance 
knowledge both emerged as significant predictors but did not eliminate the effect of receiving 
cue polarity information (see Table 6). In the categorization task, cue polarity information 
also influenced performance in the first regression model. In the second step, however, only 
cue importance knowledge but neither strategy selection nor cue polarity information were 
significant predictors (see Table 6). Additionally, we conducted analyses that considered the 
interactions between strategy selection, knowledge of cue importance, and cue polarity 
information. However, because none of the interactions reached significance and otherwise 
the conclusions were unaffected we report here only the analyses without interactions. 
3.3. Discussion Study 2 
Consistent with study 1 we found that cue polarity information had an effect on 
participants’ strategy selection, with a shift to rule-based processing when initially given cue 
polarity information (e.g., Platzer and Bröder, 2012). In contrast to study 1, we found that an 
exemplar model best described the majority of participants when no cue polarity information 
was provided in judgment and categorization. One possibility is that the strict learning 
criterion used in study 2 led participants to default to an exemplar-based strategy even in the 
judgment task that is typically associated with reliance on cue abstraction (Juslin et al., 2003; 
von Helversen et al., 2010). 
Cue polarity information increased participants’ knowledge about cue importance in 
both tasks, supporting the idea that providing cue polarity information facilitates the learning 
of the correct cue weights. Further analyses suggested that the observed increase in cue 
importance knowledge when cue polarity information was provided was related to the 
increase in cue abstraction users. In the judgment task, cue abstraction users had better 
knowledge about cue importance than exemplar users independently of cue polarity 
information. In the categorization task, knowledge about cue importance increased with cue 
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polarity information for users of a cue abstraction strategy, but not for users of an exemplar-
based strategy. This suggests that strategy selection and knowledge about cue importance may 
be closely linked, resonating with the work by Platzer and Bröder (2012) who showed that 
cue polarity information increases reliance on a cue abstraction strategy by improving 
knowledge about the task.  
Analyses investigating the relative contribution of knowledge about cue importance 
and strategy selection suggested that a shift towards relying on cue-abstraction processes was 
related to superior performance in the judgment but not the categorization task. However, 
explicit knowledge about relative cue importance had a positive influence on performance in 
both the judgment and the categorization tasks. We discuss possible reasons for this last 
finding below. 
4. General discussion 
Common sense, as well as a wealth of experimental evidence, suggests that the more 
knowledge we have about a task the better we will perform at it (e.g., Balzer et al., 1989; 
Balzer et al., 1992; Heit et al., 2004; Hoffman et al., 2008; Kareleia and Hogarth, 2008). The 
goal of the present research was to investigate the benefits of providing judges with cue 
polarity information so as to tease apart its effects on both strategy selection and explicit task 
knowledge. To this end, we conducted two studies investigating whether providing cue 
polarity information increased knowledge about cue importance and reliance on a rule-based, 
cue abstraction strategy relative to a similarity-based, exemplar strategy in a categorization 
and a multiple-cue judgment task. 
Providing participants with cue polarity information before the judgment and 
categorization tasks strongly affected participants’ strategy selection. Specifically, 
participants relied more frequently on a cue abstraction strategy than an exemplar-based 
strategy after receiving cue polarity information. This shift was most impressive in a 
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categorization task that typically involves the use of exemplar-based strategies (Juslin et al., 
2003; von Helversen et al., 2010). These findings match recent results suggesting that prior 
knowledge about cue polarity can influence whether participants rely on a rule-based or a 
similarity-based strategy when making point estimates (von Helversen and Rieskamp, 2009), 
decisions (Bröder et al., 2010; Platzer and Bröder, 2012), or probabilistic categorizations 
(Newell et al., 2009). 
Regarding performance, our results suggest that the effects of strategy selection on 
performance may be restricted to a linear multiple-cue judgment task. In study 1, we found 
benefits of cue polarity information in the judgment but not in the categorization task. In 
study 2, we found benefits of cue polarity information on both multiple-cue judgment and 
categorization but strategy selection was only predictive of increased performance in the 
judgment task. The results suggest that the benefits of providing cue polarity through strategy 
selection will be greatest in tasks that can be accurately solved by rule-based strategies such 
as linear judgment tasks and thus people can benefit from using the more accurate strategy in 
such situations. The effects of cue polarity information on strategy selection suggest that 
providing cue polarity information could sometimes also lead to negative consequences. 
When a task cannot be solved by a rule-based strategy, as for example in a task with a 
quadratic relation between cues and criterion, a bias toward cue abstraction could be 
detrimental to performance (Olsson et al., 2006). 
In the categorization task, strategy selection did not have an impact on performance, 
even though in principle a cue abstraction strategy should outperform an exemplar strategy, 
because the former matches the (linear) task structure. One possible explanation is that 
performance differences in the categorization task were masked by the binary nature of the 
criterion that is less sensitive than the fine-grained criterion in the judgment task. However, 
analyses using an equally coarse performance measure for the multiple-cue judgment task and 
the categorization tasks rendered a similar pattern of results. Alternatively, it could be that in 
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categorization cue abstraction users do not learn to execute the cue abstraction strategy well 
enough to allow performance differences between strategies to manifest themselves. This 
explanation is also in line with the finding that the explicit knowledge about cue importance 
for cue abstraction users tended to be higher in the judgment than in the categorization task.  
We also found that providing cue polarity information led to better explicit knowledge 
of relative cue importance (study 2). One novel aspect of our results is the finding that 
although cue abstraction users had better explicit knowledge about cue importance than 
exemplar users, explicit knowledge of cue importance was associated with improved 
performance independent of the task and the strategy used. This finding is particularly 
noteworthy because it challenges the idea that explicit knowledge is irrelevant when 
similarity-based processes are used that some have argued to be of an implicit nature (e.g., 
Ashby et al., 1998). There are at least two different interpretations of this finding. First, one 
could interpret these results as suggesting that similarity-based processes can benefit from 
explicit knowledge of relative cue importance. For instance, explicit knowledge about cue 
importance could increase performance by guiding attention given to each cue when using a 
similarity-based process. However, and alternatively, one could interpret the benefits of 
explicit knowledge in categorization as suggesting that participants did not rely on a pure 
similarity-based strategy but instead relied on integration of rule-based and similarity-based 
processes (Erikson and Kruschke, 1998; von Helversen et al., in press). According to such an 
interpretation, the performance benefits provided by explicit knowledge would result from 
any benefits obtained through improved cue abstraction. One should note that our results on 
explicit knowledge are of correlational nature. Thus, we cannot say if explicit knowledge 
caused better performance or was a by-product of a more efficient process. Clearly, future 
studies are needed that distinguish between these possibilities and investigate the link between 
explicit task knowledge and similarity-based processes in inference tasks. 
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5. Conclusion 
Our results suggest that prior knowledge about cue polarity can be a powerful tool to 
generate performance benefits in inference. In both a judgment and a categorization task, 
participants learnt faster and performed better in a generalization test when cue polarity 
information was provided. Although cue polarity information increased reliance on rule-based 
strategies and knowledge about cue importance, the relative importance of these two 
mechanisms for performance depended on the task. While increased reliance a rule-based 
strategy only improved performance in the judgment task, knowledge about cue importance 
increased performance independently of the task and the strategy used. Our results suggest 
that instructing human judges through providing cue polarity information can have broader 
impact on task representations by improving the knowledge of cue importance that has the 
potential to improve both categorization and multiple-cue judgment.  
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Tables 
Table 1. Structure of the Task 
Item Cue 
1 
Cue 
2 
Cue 
3 
Cue 
4 
Critcon CAMcon EBMcon Critbin CAMbin EBMbin Training
/Test 
1 0 0 0 0 10 10.0 12.4 0 0.0 0.0 Test 
2 0 0 0 1 11 11.0 11.0 0 0.0 0.0 Training 
3 0 0 1 0 12 12.0 12.0 0 0.0 0.1 Training 
4 0 0 1 1 13 13.0 13.0 0 0.0 0.1 Training 
5 0 1 0 0 13 13.0 13.0 0 0.0 0.0 Training 
6 0 1 0 1 14 14.0 14.0 0 0.0 0.1 Training 
7 0 1 1 0 15 15.0 13.8 .5 1.0 0.6 Test 
8 0 1 1 1 16 16.0 16.0 1 1.0 0.8 Training 
9 1 0 0 0 14 14.0 14.0 0 0.0 0.1 Training 
10 1 0 0 1 15 15.0 14.1 .5 0.0 0.2 Test 
11 1 0 1 0 16 16.0 16.0 1 1.0 0.9 Training 
12 1 0 1 1 17 17.0 17.0 1 1.0 0.9 Training 
13 1 1 0 0 17 17.0 13.5 1 1.0 0.2 Test 
14 1 1 0 1 18 18.0 17.1 1 1.0 0.4 Test 
15 1 1 1 0 19 19.0 18.2 1 1.0 0.9 Test 
16 1 1 1 1 20 20.0 20.0 1 1.0 1.0 Training 
Note. Training items appeared during training and test. The test items only appeared 
during test. Critcon = criterion in the judgment task; Critbin = criterion in the categorization 
task; CAMcon and CAMbin= prediction cue abstraction model in the judgment and the 
categorization task respectively; EBMcon and EBMbin= prediction of the exemplar model 
in the judgment and the categorization task respectively. Model predictions were obtained 
by fitting the models’ free parameters to the criterion values of the training items and 
predicting the responses to the test items based on the estimated parameters. 
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Table 2. Training and test performance by task and information in study 1 
  Judgment Categorization 
  Without 
information 
With 
information 
Without 
information 
With 
information 
N  25 25 25 19 
Nr. blocks training M 11.04 8.24 9.08 8.16 
SD 3.30 1.20 2.25 0.50 
Performance: Last 
block of training  
M 1.29 0.65 0.28 0.22 
SD 0.75 0.57 0.19 0.20 
Performance: Test old M 1.17 0.64 0.25 0.16 
 SD 0.75 0.52 0.19 0.21 
Performance: Test new M 1.81 0.85 0.46 0.46 
SD 0.82 0.72 0.17 0.12 
Note. Performance was measured as the root mean square deviation between participants’ 
responses and the criterion. 
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Table 3. Number of participants classified as using a cue abstraction or exemplar model in 
study 1 
 Without information With information 
Task EBM CAM EBM CAM 
Judgment 7 13 2 20 
Categorization 13 5 2 17 
Total 20 18 4 37 
Note: CAM = cue abstraction model; EBM = exemplar model. 
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Table 4. Means and SD of performance (RMSD) by task and information in study 2 
  Judgment Categorization 
  Without 
information 
With 
information 
Without 
information 
With 
information 
N  38 37 41 39 
Nr. blocks training M 17.37 9.54 12.80 7.10 
SD 4.85 5.88 5.86 5.41 
Performance: Last 
block of training 
M 1.65 0.92 0.13 0.02 
SD 0.96 0.94 0.23 0.09 
Performance: Test old M 1.44 0.66 0.21 0.15 
SD 0.74 0.69 0.18 0.13 
Performance: Test new M 2.24 1.01 0.53 0.43 
 SD 0.96 0.86 0.14 0.13 
Cue importance 
knowledge 
M 45.63 28.05 59.02 45.64 
SD 25.30 29.18 24.10 19.16 
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Table 5. Number of participants classified as using a cue abstraction or exemplar model in 
study 2 
 Without information With information 
Task EBM CAM EBM CAM 
Judgment 23 11 5 31 
Categorization 25 12 9 28 
Total 48 23 14 59 
Note: CAM = cue abstraction model; EBM = exemplar model. 
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Table 6: Hierarchical regression analysis on accuracy in the test phase 
Predictor beta t(df) p-value 
Judgment 
Model 1: 
Cue polarity information 
 
-0.56 
 
5.62 (68) 
 
.001 
Model 2: 
Cue polarity information 
 
-0.17 
 
2.19 (66) 
 
.03 
Strategy classification -0.49 5.69 (66) .001 
Cue importance knowledge 0.39  5.25 (66) .001 
Categorization 
Model 1: 
Cue polarity information 
 
-0.30 
 
2.70 (72) 
 
.009 
Model 2: 
Cue polarity information 
 
-0.21 
 
1.67 (70) 
 
.10 
Strategy classification -0.03 0.27 (70) .79 
Cue importance knowledge .48 3.30 (70) .002 
Note: Judgment R2 = .71; Categorization R2 = .18 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. Percent of participants in study 1 classified as using the cue abstraction model and 
the exemplar model in the judgment task (left panel) and in the categorization task (right 
panel). CAM = cue abstraction model; EBM = exemplar model. 
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Figure 2. Percent of participants in study 2 classified as using the cue abstraction model and 
the exemplar model in the judgment task (left panel) and in the categorization task (right 
panel). CAM = cue abstraction model; EBM = exemplar model. 
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